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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RISKS OF RIDESHARING:  
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF  
PASSENGERS IN UBER AND LYFT 
Genesis Martinez* 
ABSTRACT 
The Fourth Amendment provides limited protections for automobile 
passengers against governmental intrusion. A passenger is only protected 
against unreasonable searches in places where he harbors a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court has not yet considered the 
reasonable expectation of privacy of passengers in Uber and Lyft. The 
modern transportation innovations require that the Court consider the 
reasonableness of the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. In application, 
the doctrine does not adequately protect Uber and Lyft passengers, because 
it fails to consider how transportation advances have evolved society’s 
privacy expectations. To remedy these shortcomings, the Court must 
establish consistent jurisprudence for privacy rights in vehicles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Last Saturday evening, as a night of dancing and champagne in New 
York City was coming to an end, I considered my options for getting back to 
my hotel. I thought to myself, “Hmmm, I could be a true ‘New Yorker’ and 
walk in the blistering cold or I could hail a taxicab.” As I stepped outside the 
bar and a chilling gust of wind struck me and my younger sister, she turned 
to me and said: “If you want to get home before sunrise, let’s call an Uber!” 
I shuffled to open the Uber application on my phone and requested a ride. 
Immediately, I was matched with Roberto, a driver with a near perfect rating 
of 4.8 stars. As we waited for the car to arrive, the Uber application invited 
me to explore the driver’s profile. I learned that Roberto had been driving for 
Uber for eleven months, and that he spoke both English and Spanish. 
Thankfully, the Uber arrived in few minutes. Once we were inside, I 
turned to my younger sister and asked: “Why did you insist that I call an 
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Uber? We could’ve hailed a taxi if we had a little more patience.” My 
millennial sister flashed a sarcastic grin and said, “C’mon, everyone uses 
ridesharing apps like Uber and Lyft nowadays because it’s cheaper, faster, 
and more convenient. We could’ve called the Uber from inside the bar and it 
would’ve been waiting for us before we even stepped outside.” She 
continued, “Plus, I feel more comfortable because I can check out the driver’s 
credentials before the car gets here. I guess I just feel safer and ‘in control’ 
when I take an Uber.” 
In that moment, I realized the immense impact ridesharing services like 
Uber and Lyft had made in the transportation industry. I understood why 
Uber and Lyft were so popular: the car—which I refer to as a “modern for-
hire vehicle”1—arrived quickly, the service was offered at a competitive fare, 
and the process for requesting the ride was seamless. Most importantly, 
riding in a non-commercial car made me feel like I was riding with a friend: 
I could sit wherever I wanted, and I could adjust the radio at my leisure. 
Despite the fact that I had never met my driver, browsing through his profile 
made me feel safer than I would a feel in a taxicab. What I did not know at 
the moment was that the feeling of greater safety may have just been a 
double-edged sword.  
As a passenger in an automobile, an individual may be subject to police 
interference. As a general matter, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Normally, a police officer must 
have a lawful warrant to conduct a search, otherwise the search is “per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”3 But under the automobile 
exception, officers are authorized to conduct warrantless searches of 
automobiles.4 Further, the common enterprise assumption5 and the search 
incident to arrest rule6 sometimes allow officers to conduct warrantless 
searches of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, including any person, 
“purse, briefcase, or other container within that space.”7 
Nevertheless, “a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate 
the Fourth Amendment”8 if an officer conducts a warrantless search of a 
 
1 This Comment will use the term “traditional for-hire vehicle” to describe taxicabs, limousines, 
and buses. On the other hand, it will use the term “modern for-hire vehicle” to describe the quasi-private 
vehicles used by ridesharing companies such as Uber and Lyft. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
4 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
5 See generally Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
6 See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
7 Id. at 345. 
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968). 
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passenger’s person or belongings without a lawful basis.9 To claim the 
protection of the Amendment, a non-owner passenger must have “a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded” vehicle.10 In essence, the 
passenger “must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy 
in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.”11 Therefore, 
under the Fourth Amendment, anything that an individual “seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”12 And an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable if he 
“owns or lawfully possesses or controls property . . . by virtue of this right to 
exclude.”13 
In this day and age, technology is granting the government greater 
access to areas and information that individuals “seek[] to preserve as 
private.”14 This raises serious issues in regard to individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment protections, because greater governmental access could infringe 
on an individual’s right to exclude. Currently, the Supreme Court has 
considered the effect of technology on an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights in only a select number of cases.15 For example, in Jones v. United 
States, the Supreme Court made clear that individuals are not protected from 
all forms of governmental interference under the Fourth Amendment.16 The 
Court reinforced the premise that the Amendment “protects against 
trespassory searches only with regard to those items (‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects’) that it enumerates.”17 Further, it noted that “the Fourth 
Amendment is [not] concerned with ‘any technical trespass that led to the 
gathering of evidence.’”18 In fact, “trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz 
invasion of privacy, is not alone a search [protectable under the Amendment] 
unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is 
not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of 
 
9 See generally Gant, 556 U.S. at 332 (extending the scope of a search incident to arrest to include 
the passenger compartment if it is within the arrestee’s reach at the time of arrest or if it is reasonable to 
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest could be found in the vehicle); Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295 
(allowing warrantless searches of passengers who are believed to be engaged in a common enterprise with 
the driver). 
10 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 
(1967)). 
11 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). 
12 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
13 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
14 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
15 See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 n.8 (2012). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (citation omitted). 
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privacy.”19 In sum, the Court held that “the [g]overnment’s installation of a 
GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the 
vehicle’s movements”20 was a physical intrusion that “would have been 
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it 
was adopted.”21  
By reviving the common-law trespassory test in Jones,22 the Court 
suggested that individuals’ privacy rights are shrinking in the technological 
age. Considering that physical intrusion is no longer necessary for many 
forms of surveillance, the government can easily access an individual’s 
private areas and information without violating the Fourth Amendment.23 In 
the concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor notes that the “technological 
advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques 
will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy 
expectations.”24 It seems that Justice Sotomayor’s insightful understanding 
of the intersection between technology and the Fourth Amendment will play 
a vital role for the protection of privacy rights in the midst of a technology 
driven world. But for now, as technology advances and continues to provide 
the government greater access to private areas and information, an 
individual’s zone of privacy will continue to shrink. 
Although the trend of shrinking privacy interests does not come as a 
surprise when it comes to technology, it would be unexpected in modern 
transportation. Despite the understanding that an individual has a diminished 
privacy interest in vehicles, that interest “is nevertheless important and 
deserving of constitutional protection.”25 With the advent of Uber and Lyft, 
the scope of a passenger’s protection from police interference in a modern 
for-hire vehicle is unclear. Simply put, under the current Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, it is unsettled whether a passenger in a modern for-hire vehicle has 
“a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”26 
Modern for-hire vehicles raise serious questions about the 
reasonableness of the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine.27 Currently, 
 
19 Id. at 408 n.5 (referencing Katz, 389 U.S. 347). 
20 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
21 Id. at 404–05. 
22 Id. at 409. 
23 See id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
24 Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (referencing Katz, 389 U.S. at 347). “I would take these 
attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal 
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.” Id. 
25 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009). 
26 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
27 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (explaining that to determine 
whether a warrantless search of a passenger in a vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment, the court “must 
evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, 
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passengers are left to balance their interest in easier, cheaper rides against the 
disadvantage of unclear Constitutional rights. Is this a risk every rider is 
willing to take in order to save a couple of dollars? Probably not, and the 
most daunting concern is that the majority of modern for-hire passengers are 
not aware of these risks. Yet, one thing is certain: “technological 
advances . . . will . . . affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal 
privacy expectations.”28 But because the existing jurisprudence is outdated, 
it fails to account for the modern innovations of transportation and how it has 
transformed society’s privacy expectations.  
In anticipation of cases concerning searches of passengers in modern 
for-hire vehicles, the Supreme Court needs to establish consistent 
jurisprudence for privacy rights in vehicles. Future courts should find that 
passengers in modern for-hire vehicles have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, because these passengers’ subjective expectation of privacy is “one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”29 This Comment will 
analyze the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and use it as a tool for 
discussing the reasonableness of warrantless searches of passengers in 
modern for-hire vehicles. The introduction introduces the Fourth 
Amendment concerns of passengers in modern for-hire vehicles. Part I 
discusses the existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II of this 
Comment provides a taxonomy for passenger rides under the Fourth 
Amendment and provides background on each classification. Part III 
addresses the forward-looking application of the current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence to determine the reasonableness of searches of passengers in 
modern for-hire vehicles. Part IV proposes the creation of a set of cogent 
guidelines to be used by future courts who will address the Fourth 
Amendment protections of passengers in modern for-hire vehicles. 
I. REMEMBERING THE ANTIQUE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
DOCTRINE 
A. The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Interests 
The Fourth Amendment provides the “right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”30 “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
 
the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests”). 
28 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (referencing Katz, 389 U.S. at 347). 
29 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
30 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
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reasonableness.”31 Only governmental actions are subject to the Fourth 
Amendment, specifically, actions that constitute a “search or seizure”32 as 
defined by the courts.33 To determine whether a search violates the Fourth 
Amendment, the court “must evaluate the search . . . under traditional 
standards of reasonableness”34 by focusing on “the governmental interest 
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected 
interests of the private citizen.”35 Then it must balance the “the need to search 
. . . against the invasion which the search . . . entails.”36 
An individual’s right to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
depends “upon whether the . . . [individual] has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place.”37 In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence pronounces a two-prong test for this determination.38 First, an 
individual must exhibit “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” in the 
invaded place.39 Second, an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy 
must be legitimate, meaning it must be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as objectively reasonable.40 
To meet the second prong of the Katz test, an individual’s expectation 
of privacy must stem from “a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either 
by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings 
that are recognized and permitted by society.”41 Despite the Court’s 
recognition that a search can occur without physical intrusion,42 “[r]ecent 
cases . . . reflect the Supreme Court’s continued consideration of property 
interests in determining Fourth Amendment privacy interests.”43 As 
traditionally held in Rakas v. Illinois: 
 
31 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). 
32 Reasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
33 See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299; see generally Dante P. Trevisani, Passenger Standing to 
Challenge Searches and Seizures: A Distinction Without a Constitutional Difference, 61 FLA. L. REV. 
329, 332–33 (2009). 
34 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299–300. 
35 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
36 Id. (citation omitted). 
37 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 
(1967). 
38 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
39 Id.; see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. 
40 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
41 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
42 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
43 United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1256–57 (3d Cir. 1992). See generally Florida v. Riley, 
488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 
(1987). 
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While “[e]xpectations of privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment . . . need not be based on a common-law interest 
in real or personal property, . . . by focusing on legitimate 
expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of 
property concepts in determining the presence or absence of 
the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.”44 
All in all, an individual who owns, lawfully possesses, or controls property 
is likely to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that property because 
he has a right to exclude others.45 
Accordingly, under the Fourth Amendment, an individual does not have 
the same degree of protection in all invaded places.46 If an individual has a 
lesser expectation of privacy, the individual will be subject to greater police 
intrusion. In other words, a lawful search under the Fourth Amendment will 
have fewer restrictions if the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
is diminished. The Supreme Court has established extensive precedent which 
essentially categorizes invaded places into a hierarchy of greater or lesser 
privacy protections.  
At the top of the hierarchy and “[a]t the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands 
‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”47 An individual’s privacy interests in 
his own home are almost absolute, but an individual’s privacy interests in the 
home of another may be diminished.48 In Minnesota v. Carter, the Court 
equated an overnight guest’s privacy interests with those of the home 
owner.49 On the other hand, the Carter Court held that commercial guests did 
not have the heightened protections enjoyed by a home owner because “[a]n 
expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, 
 
44 United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12). 
45 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (“One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to 
exclude others, . . . and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”); see also Kennedy, 638 F.3d 
at 164 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12) (“[O]ne who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property 
will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his] right to exclude.”). 
46 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (explaining that private property must be 
enumerated in the Amendment’s text to be protected and introduces the concept of heightened or lessened 
protections). 
47 Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
48 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (explaining that the Supreme Court has “held 
that in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone 
else”).  
49 Id. at 90 (“[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, 
but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.”). 
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and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.”50 Further 
down on the hierarchy of privacy interests are vehicles. The Court “has 
traditionally drawn a distinction between automobiles and homes or offices 
in relation to the Fourth Amendment.”51 In other words, individuals have a 
diminished expectation of privacy “in a motor vehicle because its function is 
transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of 
personal effects . . . [i]t travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants 
and its contents are in plain view.”52 While, “people are not shorn of all 
Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the 
public sidewalks,” a higher degree of police intrusion is acceptable.53 
Nonetheless, the diminished privacy interest of vehicle occupants is 
constitutionally protected.54 And so, while it is well established that the 
Amendment protects people, not places, an individual’s protection may 
depend on where that individual is.55 
B. An Individual’s Diminished Expectation of Privacy in 
Automobiles 
In consideration of the principles detailed above, the courts have 
established various rules which provide guidance for future courts to 
delineate the privacy interests of an individual in an automobile. To begin, a 
search of a person, house, paper, or effect under the Fourth Amendment 
requires a warrant based upon probable cause.56 Warrantless searches “are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”57 It is undisputed 
that automobiles are enumerated as “effects” in the Fourth Amendment,58 but 
“warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in circumstances 
in which a search of a home or office would not.”59 This section will discuss 
two exceptions to the warrant requirement that allow warrantless searches of 
automobiles: the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest 
 
50 Id. (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)). 
51 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). 
52 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). 
53 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
54 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009). 
55 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (“But the extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351 (1967). 
56 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
57 Id. 
58 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (“[A] vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used 
in the Amendment.”). 
59 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). 
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exception. Additionally, it will discuss the common enterprise assumption, 
which also allows warrantless searches of passengers.  
1. The Automobile Exception 
In United States v. Carroll, the Court provided a warrant requirement 
specific to automobiles.60 Under the automobile exception, a warrantless 
search of an automobile is permissible if based upon probable cause, “that is, 
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing 
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is 
subject to seizure and destruction.”61 The Court’s reasoning for providing an 
automobile warrant exception is grounded in the two justifications.  
First, the “inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of 
such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the 
warrant requirement is impossible.”62 Even if the vehicle is not actually 
moving at the time of the encounter, “the vehicle is obviously readily mobile 
by the turn of an ignition key.”63 In summary, restricting officers from 
searching an automobile until a lawful warrant is obtained presents serious 
risks; by that time, it is likely that automobile has been removed from the 
jurisdiction and the contraband has been destroyed.64  
On the other hand, “the Court has also upheld warrantless searches 
where no immediate danger was presented that the car would be removed 
from the jurisdiction.”65 The second justification provided in Carroll is that 
an individual has a “reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile, owing 
to its pervasive regulation.”66 But, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court found 
that “[a]n individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all 
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use 
are subject to government regulation.”67 Justice White, writing for the 
majority, emphasized the practicality of automobile travel: 
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary 
mode of transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, 
and leisure activities. Many people spend more hours each 
 
60 See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
61 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805, 808 (1982) (“[T]he probable-cause determination 
must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely 
on the subjective good faith of the police officers.”); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149. 
62 Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367. 
63 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985). 
64 See id. at 390–91; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 151, 153.  
65 Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367. 
66 Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). 
67 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979). 
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day traveling in cars than walking on the streets. 
Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and 
privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in 
exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. 
Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental 
intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously 
circumscribed.68 
The majority’s opinion in Carroll previews an intuitive understanding 
of the future of transportation. Given the importance of automobiles today, it 
would be unreasonable for any court to hold that individuals do not have an 
expectation of privacy in automobiles. Such a finding would severely 
diminish the rights of countless individuals, considering that automobile 
travel is no longer optional in most parts of the world. While it is established 
that an individual’s privacy interests are diminished in an automobile, this 
“interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional 
protection.”69 
a. The Scope of Searches Under the Automobile Exception 
Although the Carroll exception allows lawful warrantless searches of 
automobiles, a search of “intolerable intensity and scope” will deem the 
search unconstitutional.70 Under United States v. Ross, a warrantless search 
under the automobile exception always allows officers to conduct “a ‘probing 
search’ of compartments and containers within the automobile so long as the 
search is supported by probable cause.”71 Searches can be “as thorough as a 
magistrate could authorize in a warrant ‘particularly describing the place to 
be searched.’”72 In summary, the scope “is no narrower–and no broader–than 
the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.”73  
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile “is defined by the 
object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe 
that it may be found.”74 It “is not defined by the nature of the container in 
which the contraband is secreted.”75 Therefore, “[i]f probable cause justifies 
 
68 Id. at 662–63. 
69 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009). 
70 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1968). 
71 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570 (1991) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 
800 (1982)). 
72 Ross, 456 U.S. at 800 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend IV). 
73 Id. at 823. 
74 Id. at 824. 
75 Id. 
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the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part 
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”76 
i. California v. Acevedo’s Container Rule 
Even after the Ross decision, it was unclear whether an officer had to 
establish probable cause in relation to each container searched.77 The 
Supreme Court addressed this issue in California v. Acevedo.78 It held that 
“police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they 
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”79 In 
other words, warrantless searches of containers inside of an automobile, are 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if an officer had probable cause to 
search the automobile in the first place.80 Nevertheless, this broad rule has 
one caveat: for a container to be within the scope of a warrantless automobile 
search, the container must be found in the particular part of the automobile 
in which the police have probable cause to believe that contraband is 
hidden.81 For example, probable cause that a container found in the trunk of 
a vehicle contains contraband does not justify a search of the entire vehicle; 
it only justifies a search of the container in the trunk.82 The Acevedo Court 
acknowledged that “the privacy interests in a car’s trunk or glove 
compartment may be no less than those in a movable container.”83 Even with 
this geographical limitation, warrantless searches of automobiles have few 
restrictions. 
2. Search Incident to Arrest in the Automobile Context 
Aside from the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an 
automobile may be permissible incident to a lawful arrest. Under the search 
incident to arrest rule, when an individual is lawfully arrested, an officer can 
conduct a full search of the arrestee’s person.84 In the interest of officer safety 
 
76 Id. at 825. 
77 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991). 
78 Id. at 573. 
79 Id. at 580. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. at 592 (White, J., dissenting) (“Because the police can seize the container which is the 
object of their search, they have no need either to search or to seize the entire vehicle. Indeed, as even the 
Court today recognizes, they have no authority to do so.”). 
82 See id. 
83 Id. at 573 (1991) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)). 
84 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (finding that under the search incident to arrest 
rule it “is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s 
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction”). 
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and evidence preservation,85 an officer could also search the area within the 
arrestee’s immediate control. Also known as the grabbing area, the Court 
construed “that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”86 Depending on the area 
where an individual is arrested, the scope of these warrantless searches can 
be extended further to include other persons and items. 
The scope of the search incident to arrest rule was considered in the 
automobile context in Arizona v. Gant.87 The Court overruled the broad 
interpretation of the rule in New York v. Belton, which allowed an automatic 
search of the passenger compartment pursuant to a lawful arrest of an 
occupant.88 Under Gant, a search incident to arrest “permit[s] an officer to 
conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the 
vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
offense of arrest.”89 The majority contends that the rule is grounded in 
“concern[s] about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at 
will among a person’s private effects.”90 Yet, the searches permissible under 
the rule are very extensive. If either of the prongs of the Gant test are met, it 
“authorize[s] police officers to search not just the passenger compartment but 
every purse, briefcase, or other container within that space.”91 In justification, 
the Court claimed that “[t]hese exceptions together ensure that officers may 
search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered 
during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search.”92 
a. Passenger’s Privacy Rights: Wyoming v. Houghton’s 
Common Enterprise Assumption 
Wyoming v. Houghton’s common enterprise assumption is the best 
guidance provided by the Court on this passenger privacy question.93 In 
Houghton, a police officer pulled over David Young because his car had a 
 
85 See id. 
86 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 
87 See generally id. at 332. 
88 See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
89 Gant, 556 U.S. at 346. 
90 Id. at 345. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 347. 
93 See generally Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Daniel J. Hewitt, Don’t Accept 
Rides from Strangers: The Supreme Court Hastens the Demise of Passenger Privacy in American 
Automobiles, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875 (2000); see also Think Twice Before Sharing a Ride: 
Probable Cause to Arrest All Occupants of Vehicle, 18 NO. 1 CRIM. PRAC. REP. 1 (2004) (discussing the 
implications of the common enterprise assumption for passengers in a vehicle containing illegal 
contraband).  
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faulty break light and he was speeding.94 Young was accompanied by his 
girlfriend and Sandra Houghton.95 When he approached, the officer noticed 
a needle in Young’s shirt pocket.96 Notwithstanding the fact that Young 
admitted to using the needle to take drugs, the officer searched the passenger 
compartment for contraband.97 The search uncovered a purse which 
Houghton claimed to be hers.98 The officer then proceeded to search 
Houghton’s purse, in which he found drug paraphernalia and 
methamphetamine.99 Houghton was subsequently arrested and contested the 
validity of the search.100 The Supreme Court found the search of Houghton’s 
purse was reasonable and introduced the common enterprise assumption.101 
Under the common enterprise rule, when an officer is conducting a 
lawful search based upon probable cause, a presumption arises that the 
occupants in a vehicle are in a common enterprise.102 Based on the 
assumption, “it is reasonable for police officers . . . to examine packages and 
containers [found inside the vehicle] without a showing of individualized 
probable cause for each one.”103 The Court claims that a driver and passenger 
will often “have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of 
their wrongdoing.”104 
In effect, the common enterprise rule under Houghton is an automatic 
presumption. Simply being a passenger in a vehicle which is stopped and 
subsequently searched, is sufficient for this assumption to arise. An officer 
does not need a “positive reason to believe that the passenger and driver were 
engaged in a common enterprise, or positive reason to believe that the driver 
had time and occasion to conceal the item in the passenger’s belongings, 
surreptitiously or with friendly permission.”105 Instead, an officer can search 
a passenger’s belongings even without suspicion. Justice Steven’s dissent 
points out that the “assumption of common enterprise between the passenger 
and driver of a car [are] based simply on physical proximity.”106 
 
94 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 297. 
95 Id. at 298. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 298. 
101 Id. at 305. 
102 Id. at 304–05. 
103 Id. at 302. 
104 Id. at 304–05. 
105 Id. at 305. 
106 Hewitt, supra note 93 at 897. 
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This doctrine was revisited in Maryland v. Pringle.107 In that case, an 
officer stopped and searched an automobile which contained large quantity 
of drugs and cash.108 When the three occupants of the vehicle denied 
knowledge of the drugs and cash, the officer presumed they were in a 
common enterprise and placed all three occupants under arrest.109 On review, 
the Court found it was “an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that 
any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion 
and control over, the cocaine.”110 It noted that “[t]he quantity of drugs and 
cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which 
a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to 
furnish evidence against him.”111 All in all, the majority’s view is that 
“[w]hile the Fourth Amendment does not permit guilt by association, . . . it 
does allow police officers to use common sense and infer a common 
enterprise among co-passengers of a small automobile where drug dealing is 
likely.”112 Allowing officers to use their common sense to analyze the 
situation before presuming that the driver and passenger are engaged in a 
common enterprise, might indicate that the common enterprise assumption 
does not always arise automatically anymore. 
II. SOMETHING OLD AND SOMETHING NEW: TRADITIONAL FOR-
HIRE VEHICLES AND MODERN FOR-HIRE VEHICLES 
A. Fourth Amendment Taxonomy of Passenger Rides 
Most individuals select their method of transportation without any 
thought of the implications it may have on their Fourth Amendment rights. 
But the unrecognized reality is that an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
protections may be heightened or diminished depending on the type of 
vehicle they are in or type of ride in which they are engaging. A consistent 
analysis of the existing Fourth Amendment suggests that a passenger’s choice 
of transportation will dictate the permissible scope of police intrusion 
throughout their ride. 
For this Comment, I have categorized passenger rides into three 
classifications, which I will refer to as “the taxonomy of passenger rides.” 
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, this categorization is best described 
 
107 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). 
108 Id. at 368–69. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 372 (emphasis added). 
111 Id. at 373. 
112 Farkarlun v. Hanning, 855 F. Supp. 2d 906, 918–19 (D. Minn. 2012). 
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as a taxonomy because it classifies the types of rides passengers commonly 
engage in according to the nature of the ride and the type of vehicle the ride 
is completed in. The taxonomy of passenger rides facilitates the analysis and 
application of the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
The first type of rides are gratuitous or friendly rides in which 
individuals choose to ride as passengers in a friend’s or family member’s 
vehicle. This type of ride is non-commercial: the passenger does not pay a 
fare for the ride because the driver and the passenger have some type of non-
commercial relationship.113 The driver uses his personal non-commercial 
vehicle114 to transport the passenger.  
Next, some passengers opt for paid transportation such as taxicabs, 
limousines, and buses. These types of rides, known as traditional for-hire 
rides,115 require that the passenger pay a fare for the service. The driver and 
passenger have no connection aside from this commercial transportation 
transaction.116 Traditional for-hire vehicles are specifically manufactured for 
commercial use, and typically include physical partitions dividing the 
passenger area from the driver’s area. For example, most taxicabs have a 
physical partition which divides the cab into two cabins: the driver’s cabin 
and the passenger cabin. 
Lastly, passengers can elect to take an Uber or Lyft, a quasi-private 
vehicle engaging in ridesharing rides, or modern for-hire rides. The driver 
and passenger are matched through a smartphone application.117 Similar to 
traditional for-hire rides, the driver and passenger have no connection aside 
from the immediate commercial transportation transaction.118 Drivers use 
their private vehicles to complete these commercial rides, so unlike 
traditional for-hire vehicles, these vehicles do not have a physical partition. 
Uber and Lyft drivers use their personal vehicle during “work hours” and are 
likely to continue to use the same vehicle after and before subsequent shifts. 
A close reading of the Katz 119 test and the Fourth Amendment doctrine 
mentioned in Part I of this Comment, indicate that courts must take into 
account the difference between these types of rides and analyze how the 
 
113 This relationship requirement can include (but is not limited to): friends, neighbors, family, 
and co-conspirators. 
114 The vehicle is owned and used by the driver for personal purposes, such as commuting to 
everyday activities. 
115 I will also use the term “traditional for-hire” as a short reference throughout this Comment. 
116 Situations where a commercial driver has a long-standing agreement with a passenger, in which 
the driver provides rides regularly for the passenger, are outside of the scope of this paper. 
117 How Lyft Works: 6 Things to Know Before Your First Ride, LYFT BLOG (Jun. 9, 2016), 
https://blog.lyft.com/posts/how-does-lyft-work. 
118 Situations where a modern for-hire driver has a long-standing agreement with a passenger, in 
which the driver provides rides regularly for the passenger, are outside of the scope of this paper. 
119 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring). 
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differences affect the passenger’s subjective expectation of privacy and 
society’s objective expectation of privacy. The taxonomy of passenger rides 
will facilitate the Katz analysis when conducted by future courts.120  
1. For-Hire Vehicles 
In order to understand the taxonomy, it is essential to understand the 
origin of for-hire rides. A car for-hire is a vehicle used to provide individuals 
with transportation services in exchange for monetary compensation.121 In 
reality “any motor vehicle, when used for transporting persons or goods for 
compensation” is a for-hire vehicle.122 Typically, they are commercial 
vehicles such as taxicabs, limousines, and buses.123 Traditional black cars and 
app-based car services like Uber and Lyft have also been classified as for-
hire vehicles.124 Much like Uber and Lyft, a black car service is a company 
who subcontracts work to independent drivers that own and operate their own 
vehicles.125 In New York, black cars are considered “[a] segment of the for-
hire vehicle industry [which] primarily serves business clientele with luxury 
cars.”126 
This Comment divides for-hire vehicles into two classifications: 
traditional for-hire vehicles and modern for-hire vehicles. Traditional for-hire 
vehicles include forms of commercial transportation that have been already 
analyzed by the courts: taxicabs, limousines, buses, and black cars. Modern 
for-hire vehicles include the vehicles used in app-based ridesharing services 
like Uber and Lyft, which have not yet been analyzed by the courts. 
2. Traditional For-Hire Vehicles: A Passenger’s Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy in a Taxicab 
There is vast precedent discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy 
of passengers in traditional for-hire vehicles. While the lower courts are split 
 
120 Id. 
121 FLA. STAT. § 320.01(15)(a) (2018). 
122 Id. 
123 OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., FOR-HIRE VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION STUDY 1  
(2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/For-Hire-Vehicle-Transportation-
Study.pdf. 
124 Id. 
125 Jarrad Kulick, Executive Car Service Vs. Black Car Service, ALL STAR LIMOUSINE SERV. LTD. 
(Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.allstarlimo.com/All-Star-Limo-Blog/2013/8/Executive-Car-Service-Vs-
Black-Car-Service.  
126 Definitions: Taxi, Livery, Car Service, Black Car, SCHALLER CONSULTING ARCHIVE (2002), 
http://www.schallerconsult.com/taxi/newfb/defin.htm. 
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on question of passenger privacy, the Katz Court clearly established that an 
individual in a taxicab “may rely upon the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.”127 Consistent with the Court’s analysis in Katz, other courts 
have found that the fare, the right to control the vehicle’s destination, and the 
right to exclude, sufficiently establish a taxicab passenger’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.128  
In United States v. Santiago, the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York held that passengers in taxicabs have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy based on their ability to exclude others from the ride.129 The court 
found that a taxicab passenger’s expectation of privacy is objectively 
reasonable because the rear area of the taxicab is the area that the passenger 
pays to control.130 This finding turned on the distinction that “[t]ypically, a 
passenger in an automobile does not have a right to expect privacy as he has 
no right to exclude others from the car.”131 In contrast, because a taxicab 
passenger determines the destination of the taxicab, the passenger “may 
exclude others from the cab, as he has hired the cab for his exclusive use for 
the duration of his trip. In effect, the passenger area belongs to the passenger 
who pays for it during the course of the trip.”132  
In United States v. Bulluck, the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York rejected the contention that taxicab passengers have the ability 
to exclude others.133 First, it found that a passenger’s ability to object to the 
cab driver taking on another fare did not equate to the capacity to exclude all 
other individuals from the cab.134 Then, the court maintained that 
“[p]assengers have no meaningful privacy in a cab,”135 because the driver “is 
inches away at all times and can see and hear everything that is happening in 
the rear seat.”136 Most importantly, the court alleged that passengers do not 
have sufficient dominion or control of the taxicab because “the cab driver 
 
127 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
128 See United States v. Santiago, 950 F. Supp. 590, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Chapa v. State, 729 
S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (finding that although “the driver of the cab, though a perfect 
stranger, may have shared a degree of privacy in the area beneath the front seat . . . does not defeat 
appellant’s reasonable claim to freedom from government intrusion there”). 
129 See generally Santiago, 950 F. Supp. at 590. 
130 Id. at 598. 
131 Id. at 597. 
132 Id. at 598. 
133 See generally United States v. Bulluck, No. 09 Cr. 652 (PGG), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47577, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2010). 
134 Id. at *63. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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never surrenders actual control over the cab to a passenger, maintains custody 
of the keys to the cab, and controls its locks at all times.”137 
Subsequently, United States v. Mota was decided, in which the District 
Court recognized that Bulluck incorrectly held that passengers in taxicabs did 
not have an expectation of privacy.138 It mentions that occasionally courts 
have found that taxicab passengers have an expectation of privacy “by virtue 
of their ability to exclude others and determine the course of the taxicab for 
the duration of their ride.”139 Impliedly, Bulluck can only stand for the 
proposition that the power to object to a driver taking on another fare is not 
sufficient to establish a passenger’s control and ability to exclude others for 
the duration of the ride.140 In effect, it leaves open the possibility for future 
litigants to establish that for-hire passengers have sufficient control under 
Katz based on other abilities.141 
3. Modern For-Hire Vehicles: The Advent of Technology 
Based Transportation 
While Uber and Lyft may be well known in the transportation market, 
the nature of the rides provided by these companies are an issue of first 
impression to the Fourth Amendment. Although the quasi-private vehicles 
used by Uber and Lyft are for-hire vehicles, they are distinguishable from 
taxicabs and limousines. Modern for-hire vehicles do not fit in neatly into the 
courts’ Fourth Amendment analysis of traditional for-hire vehicles. In order 
to make sense of the reasoning behind the taxonomy of passenger rides, it is 
important to understand ridesharing and become familiar with the companies 
who provide these services.142 
Nowadays, ridesharing is most individuals’ preferred method of 
transportation. Ridesharing is an arrangement made through a smartphone 
application “in which a passenger travels in a private vehicle driven by its 
owner for a fee.”143 These services are particularly popular in cities like New 
 
137 Id. at *62. 
138 United States v. Mota, 155 F. Supp. 3d 461, 471 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
139 Id. 
140 Bulluck, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47577, at *1. 
141 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
142 As a general note, this background section is also based on the author’s personal experience 
with Uber and Lyft. 
143 Ride-Share, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/search?q=google+dictionary&oq=google+dictionary&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l5.
5158j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#dobs=ride-share (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
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York and San Francisco where taxicabs are difficult to hail.144 Determination 
to make transportation cheaper and easier lead to the creation of an affordable 
black car service with a technological twist.145 The evolution was led by two 
companies known as Uber and Lyft.146 The first ridesharing application, 
created by Uber Technologies Inc., hit the market in June 2010.147 
Subsequently, Lyft launched in 2012.148 
Although Uber and Lyft are separate companies, essentially, they 
provide the same service: commercial transportation in privately owned 
vehicles driven by the vehicle’s owner. Gone are the days of hailing rides on 
the side of the road. Uber and Lyft users can request a ride remotely in the 
tap of a finger.149 To initiate a ride, users log into the respective software 
application on their smartphone and request a ride.150 The user has an option 
to select a car-pool style ride in which the driver can pick up other customers, 
or the user can opt to request a private ride.151 Once the user is paired with an 
available driver via the application, the user is given access to the driver’s 
profile, which includes a rating based on ratings given by prior riders, “their 
name, a headshot, the make and model of their car, a photo of the car, and 
their approximate ETA in minutes.”152 Next, the driver will pick up the user 
in a privately owned vehicle and will drive the user to the selected 
destination.153 To assure that their vehicles are easily recognizable, Uber’s 
“driver partners”154 display a reflective “U” sign in the passenger side 
windshield during the hours they are actively working for Uber.155 “Lyft 
 
144 Sarah Mitroff, Uber vs Lyft: 9 Things to Consider Before Your First Ride, C|NET (Nov. 2, 
2015), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/uber-lyft-ride-share-ride-hailing/. 
145 Artyom Dogtiev, Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics 2017, BUSINESSOFAPPS (Jan. 8, 2018), 
http://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics/. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.; Mitroff, supra note 144. 
150 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015). See generally 
Mitroff, supra note 144; Dogtiev, supra note 145. 
151 Mitroff, supra note 144. 
152 Id. See also O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (“Uber provides a service whereby individuals 
in need of vehicular transportation can log in to the Uber software application on their smartphone, request 
a ride, be paired via the Uber application with an available driver, be picked up by the available driver, 
and ultimately be driven to their final destination.”). 
153 Mitroff, supra note 144; Dogtiev, supra note 145. See also O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. 
154 Uber Promotions, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1259 (N.D. Fla. 2016) 
(explaining that Uber refers to their drivers as “driver partners” to highlight that these drivers are 
independent contractors who use their own cars to transport passengers). 
155 Vehicle Requirements Augusta, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/augusta/resources/uber-u-
signs/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2018). 
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gives each driver a ‘Carstache’ (a big fuzzy pink mustache) to attach to the 
front of his car when using it to give ‘Lyfts.’”156 
During the ride, the smartphone application provides the user with a real 
time map of the ride.157 The user can change the destination of the ride at any 
time through application.158 At the end of the ride, the user is asked to rate 
the driver and provide feedback.159 The driver is also asked to rate the user.160 
The user’s rating is used to pair the user in future rides.161 The rating feature 
is important, for both drivers and passengers, because it gives them the option 
of screening out their match. For passengers, a “low rating – perhaps because 
you trashed their car . . . [or] were rude . . . –can mean that fewer drivers will 
accept your requests for a ride.”162 For modern for-hire drivers, “[u]nlike taxi 
drivers, whose driving behavior won’t necessarily affect their ability to 
continue to pick up passengers, low ratings on Lyft and Uber can cause 
drivers to lose opportunities to get business or even face penalties from the 
companies.”163 All in all, modern for-hire vehicles are distinguishable from 
traditional for-hire vehicles in many ways, which affect individuals’ 
expectation of privacy and shapes the “evolution of societal privacy 
expectations.”164 
III. CONFRONTING AN OLD PROBLEM IN A NEW SETTING: 
PREDICTING THE PRIVACY INTERESTS OF PASSENGERS IN 
MODERN FOR-HIRE VEHICLES 
A. Revisiting the Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
As technology and transportation evolve, the validity of the existing 
privacy protections is questioned. A proper analysis of the existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is conducted “under traditional standards of 
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which . . . [the 
search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
 
156 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (alteration in original). 
157 Mitroff, supra note 144. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (“I would take these attributes of GPS 
monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in 
the sum of one’s public movements.”) (referencing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
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which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”165 
Interpretation of “[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of 
what was deemed an unreasonable search . . . when it was adopted, and in a 
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights 
of individual citizens.”166 
In anticipation of cases concerning the Fourth Amendment protections 
of passengers in modern for-hire vehicles, the Court needs to establish 
jurisprudence that adequately delineates the privacy rights in modern for-hire 
vehicles. The existing precedent does not adequately “conserve public 
interests . . . [or] the interests and rights of individual citizens.”167 Because 
the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is long-established, it is unlikely 
that the Court will abandon this precedent. Instead, the existing doctrine 
should be used to provide future courts with the tools to address this privacy 
question. But it is important for future courts to take into consideration that 
modern for-hire vehicles are quasi-private, a hybrid between private and 
commercial vehicles. Therefore, while precedent addressing the privacy 
rights of traditional for-hire passengers may be informative, it fails to account 
for the private aspects of these rides. 
B. Passengers in Modern For-Hire Vehicles Have a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy Under Katz v. United States 
Future courts should consider that modern “advances . . . affect the Katz 
test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”168 Thus, in 
assessing the reasonableness of the common enterprise assumption and the 
search incident to arrest rule, courts should begin by examining the effects of 
the geographic composition of the interior of modern for-hire vehicles and 
the amount of control passengers have over the vehicle. A consistent reading 
of the Fourth Amendment precedent suggests that future courts will find that 
both prongs of the Katz test are met when framed by those considerations.169 
 
165 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). 
166 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
167 Id. at 149. 
168 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (“I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when 
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public 
movements.”) (referencing Katz, 389 U.S. at 347). 
169 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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1. The Geographical Composition of the Interior Cabin of 
Modern For-Hire Vehicles Supports Passengers’ Subjective 
Expectation of Privacy 
The existing Fourth Amendment precedent limits the scope of a 
passenger’s expectation of privacy to the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle.170 The notion is that the “the passenger area belongs to the passenger 
who pays for it during the course of the trip.”171 In traditional for-hire vehicles 
this makes sense because taxicabs, buses, and limousines usually have a 
partition which physically divides the vehicle into two cabins: the driver’s 
cabin and the passenger’s cabin. The partition serves two important 
functions. First, it prevents the passenger from reaching into the front cabin 
and adjusting the air conditioning and radio. Most importantly, it alerts 
passengers that their area of control is the passenger compartment.  
In a modern for-hire vehicle, it is unclear what geographical area would 
be considered the passenger compartment. Drivers use their own personal, 
privately owned non-commercial vehicles. Unlike commercial vehicles,172 
private vehicles typically do not have physical partitions that divide the 
passenger compartment from the driver’s compartment. These vehicles 
usually have an open format, without physical barriers to restrict the areas a 
passenger can access. This makes it even harder for a modern for-hire 
passenger to subjectively delineate the geographical areas which he has 
control over. 
To further muddy the waters, Uber and Lyft do not restrict the areas in 
which passengers can sit. Instead, they invite passengers to sit both in the 
front and in the back of the vehicle.173 Although some taxicab drivers may 
allow passengers to sit in the front seat, taxicab passengers rarely sit in the 
front because the partitions suggest that the front seat is off limits. Not only 
are the physical restrictions lacking in modern for-hire vehicles, but Uber’s 
and Lyft’s conduct promotes the line blurring. It cannot be reasonably 
predicted where a modern for-hire passenger will sit.  
Based on the geographical composition of modern for-hire vehicles, it 
is reasonable for a passenger to believe that he has an expectation of privacy 
in the interior of the vehicle. A passenger has unrestricted ability to reach 
 
170 See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 332 (2009); United States v. Santiago, 950 F. 
Supp. 590, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
171 Santiago, 950 F. Supp. at 598. 
172 In the Comment, the term “commercial vehicles” is used to reference traditional for-hire 
vehicles, like taxicabs or limousines which are built and designed for commercial transportation purposes. 
173 How Lyft Works: 6 Things to Know Before Your First Ride, supra note 117 (“It’s your ride, so 
set the tone depending on how you feel. If you want to hop in the backseat, . . . that’s no big deal — there’s 
no need to sit in the front seat and chat. But you can always ride shotgun . . . ”). 
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forward from the back seat to adjust the air conditioning or the radio. The 
passenger can also reach forward and place his belongings in the front 
passenger seat while still occupying the back seat. Passengers can even 
choose whether they want to sit in the front or back seat. In sum, the open 
format of modern for-hire vehicles allows passengers to exert physical 
control over the entire interior of the vehicle, not only the area where the 
passenger is seated. 
2. Passengers Have Lawful Control over Modern For-Hire 
Vehicles by Virtue of Their Right to Exclude 
The objective prong of the Katz test requires that an individual’s 
subjective expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’”174 The Fourth Amendment doctrine suggests that a 
passenger who can establish that he has sufficient control over the vehicle 
and a right to exclude others for the duration of the ride, meets this prong of 
the test. All the more reason, modern for-hire passengers’ subjective 
expectation of privacy is likely to satisfy the objective prong of the Katz 
test.175  
To begin, the Bulluck court incorrectly alleges that passengers do not 
have sufficient control over for-hire vehicles because the driver never 
surrenders actual control over the vehicle “to a passenger, [because the 
driver] maintains custody of the keys . . . , and controls its locks at all 
times.”176 This assertion is explicitly incorrect because the Katz test does not 
require that a passenger have actual control of the vehicle. The Court has held 
that an individual who has lawful control of property “will in all likelihood 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his] right to exclude.”177 
While it is unclear what future courts will find to be sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement, in Santiago the court held that a passenger’s ability to determine 
the destination of a taxicab and ability to exclude others was sufficient to 
establish lawful control.178 Other courts have noted that controlling access to 
the vehicle and deciding who is invited to share the space is sufficient.179A 
consistent reading of this precedent suggests that the nature of modern for-
 
174 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
175 Id. 
176 United States v. Bulluck, No. 09 CR. 652 (PGG), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47577, at *62 
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2010). 
177 United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2011). 
178 See United States v. Santiago, 950 F. Supp. 590, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
179 Bulluck, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47577, at *37 (holding “that non-owner passengers ordinarily 
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the vehicles in which they are traveling, 
because they do not control access to the vehicle and do not have the right to exclude others”). 
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hire rides and the mobile application provides passengers lawful control over 
the vehicle and the ability to exclude others from the ride.  
Next, the ratings system in the mobile application allows passengers to 
exclude others. Drivers’ ratings can be used as a screening feature by 
passengers to decide who they want to share space with. Passengers can 
decide to only ride with drivers who have a high rating. The application even 
allows passengers to cancel a ride based on a driver’s poor rating. Impliedly, 
this screening feature gives passengers control over who they will be sharing 
a vehicle with. 
Further, a modern for-hire passenger controls access to the vehicle.180 
When requesting a ride, the mobile application prompts modern-for hire 
passengers with the option to request a private ride or a carpool-style ride.181 
Unlike taxicabs, this feature vests modern for-hire passengers with the power 
to exclude others from the ride at the very outset of the engagement. The 
driver cannot force a passenger to grant access to others for the duration of 
the ride. The car-pool option, available on both Uber and Lyft, is the only 
way a driver can pick up other customers while engaging on a ride.182 The 
passenger is the only person who can make the decision to allow or to exclude 
others. By accepting a non-carpool ride, modern for-hire drivers are expressly 
acknowledging the passenger’s power to exclude. This feature alone should 
establish that modern for-hire passengers have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
Lastly, modern for-hire passengers’ ability to determine the destination 
of the vehicle is sufficient to establish lawful control. Like the taxicab 
passengers in Santiago, modern for-hire passengers decide where the vehicle 
will be going and if there will be any stops along the way, and have the ability 
to direct the driver to take a preferred route.183 The mobile application allows 
passengers to change the vehicle’s destination in real time, without approval 
of the driver. Most ridesharing companies force the driver to comply with the 
passenger’s suggested route even if it is longer or more troublesome. Even if 
the driver can refuse the change, the passenger’s ability to change the 
destination and route of the vehicle at any time establishes that modern for-
hire passengers are clearly in control of the vehicle for the duration of the 
ride. 
In sum, a modern for-hire passenger’s expectation of privacy is 
manifested by screening drivers, selecting a private ride, entering the vehicle, 
 
180 Id. 
181 Mitroff, supra note 144. 
182 Id. 
183 See generally Santiago, 950 F. Supp. at 598. 
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closing the door, and controlling the destination of the vehicle.184 From a 
Fourth Amendment perspective these features are important because privacy 
depends on an individual’s ability to control access to the vehicle and to 
decide who is invited to share the space.185 Accordingly, modern for-hire 
passengers’ expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”186 
C. The Common Enterprise Rule is Outdated 
Considering that future courts are likely to hold that passengers in 
modern for-hire vehicles have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
validity of the common enterprise assumption is at risk. A close reading of 
the common enterprise jurisprudence shows that the Court’s understanding 
of transportation and passengers is outdated. It is important to remember that 
if evidence of wrongdoing is uncovered, regardless of whether any of the 
occupants in the vehicle take ownership, the common enterprise assumption 
will operate to automatically supply probable cause to search all of the 
occupants and the vehicle.187 The common enterprise rule incorrectly 
assumes that a driver and passenger always share a common interest “in 
concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.”188 Logically, a 
common interest in harboring evidence is only plausible if the occupants have 
an ongoing relationship. Surely, a stranger will have no knowledge of any 
evidence of wrongdoing that could be found in the vehicle.  
Keeping in mind that the Houghton majority denies that the assumption 
is based on “mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal 
activity,”189 the only reasonable explanation for this rule is that Court 
assumed that people only ride in cars with friends, neighbors, family, co-
conspirators, or the like. Impliedly, the belief is that individuals do not 
typically ride in vehicles with strangers. And so, the Houghton decision failed 
 
184 Santiago, 950 F. Supp. at 598 (holding that taxicab passengers manifest their subjective 
expectation of privacy “by entering the cab, closing the door and directing the driver to a particular 
destination”). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“One who occupies it, shuts the 
door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the 
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”). 
185 Bulluck, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47577, at *37 (holding “that non-owner passengers ordinarily 
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the vehicles in which they are traveling, 
because they do not control access to the vehicle and do not have the right to exclude others”). See also 
United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 
186 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
187 See generally Think Twice Before Sharing a Ride: Probable Cause to Arrest All Occupants of 
Vehicle, supra note 93. 
188 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305 (1999). 
189 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). 
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to account for modern transportation, a time when passengers and drivers 
have no relationship prior to engaging in the ride.190 
1. The Nature of Modern For-Hire Rides Negates the Validity 
of the Common Enterprise Assumption 
To the extent that it might have been reasonable for the Court to assume 
a common interest between a driver and passengers, the advent of modern 
for-hire vehicles raises serious doubt to the plausibility of that inference. 
After the creation of Uber and Lyft, it is much more likely for persons to ride 
in vehicles with total strangers. The inference that a driver and passenger 
would have an interest in concealing evidence of wrongdoing is only 
plausible in non-commercial rides in private vehicles because these drivers 
and passengers commonly have an ongoing relationship. In contrast, the 
commercial nature of modern for-hire rides and the fleeting status of these 
passengers render the common enterprise presumption unreasonable in a 
modern for-hire vehicle.  
The commercial nature of modern for-hire rides expressly negates the 
possibility of a common enterprise: modern for-hire passengers and drivers 
have no connection aside from the immediate ride they are engaging in.191 
Uber and Lyft rides are commercial transportation transactions. The driver 
and passenger are matched through a ridesharing app.192 Modern for-hire 
drivers meet their passengers immediately before they enter the vehicle or 
once they are inside the vehicle. After the completion of a ride, the driver is 
likely to never see the passenger again. Although the application allows for 
drivers and passengers to screen each other before accepting a ride, this 
feature only provides their name and rating.193 While a driver may choose to 
accept a ride based a passenger’s five-star rating, it does not logically suggest 
that the driver will have a common interest in concealing the fruits of the 
passenger’s criminal activity. In the event that a lawful search of the vehicle 
uncovers contraband, it is unreasonable to assume that the driver would have 
any interest in protecting, harboring, or hiding any incriminating evidence for 
the passenger (and vice versa). 
 
190 See generally Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295. 
191 This Comment will not discuss the unlikely circumstance where a passenger is matched with 
a driver who they have previously been matched with. 
192 How Lyft Works: 6 Things to Know Before Your First Ride, supra note 117. 
193 Mitroff, supra note 144. 
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2. The Introduction of a Fact Driven Analysis for the Common 
Enterprise Assumption 
The common enterprise rule subjects individuals in modern for-hire 
vehicles to highly intrusive searches simply for being in close proximity to 
other law-breaking individuals. Because officers need more than just “mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity . . . [to] 
give rise to probable cause to search that person,”194 the common enterprise 
assumption is unreasonable in modern for-hire vehicles. Thus, a future court 
will need to alter the applicability of the common enterprise rule in a way that 
adequately balances the passengers’ privacy interests and the government’s 
interests. 
A modern interpretation of the common enterprise assumption is best 
embodied by converting this rule into a standard. Houghton’s common 
enterprise rule is an automatic presumption that arises without any 
consideration of the facts.195 On the other hand, the analysis in Pringle makes 
clear that in reviewing the validity of the common enterprise assumption, 
courts should consider the facts and circumstances of each case.196 The 
Pringle decision suggests that officers should be required to use their 
common sense and every day experience to properly infer a common 
enterprise.197 In essence, the Court opened the door to the possibility of 
applying the common enterprise assumption as a standard, instead of a rule. 
Even the lower courts have typically required officers to establish “something 
extra” in order to act on the inference of common enterprise. 198 For example, 
courts have required “that the passenger in question had been a co-traveler 
for a longer time, had fled from the police, or in response to police 
questioning had been untruthful, evasive or very nervous.”199  
In light of the intrusiveness of warrantless searches, the common 
enterprise rule should be applied as a standard, instead of a rule, which 
requires that officers consider the facts and circumstances of each case before 
presuming that occupants in a vehicle are engaged in a common enterprise. 
Using common sense and every day experience, officers should be required 
 
194 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91. 
195 See generally Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999). 
196 See generally Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003) (considering the number of drugs 
and money found in the vehicle to be indicative of a common enterprise). 
197 Id.; Farkarlun v. Hanning, 855 F. Supp. 2d 906, 918–19 (D. Minn. 2012) (allowing “police 
officers to use common sense and infer a common enterprise among co-passengers of a small automobile 
where drug dealing is likely”). 
198 Wayne R. LaFave & David C. Baum, § 3.6(c) Association with Another Person or With a 
Place, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2017). 
199 Id. 
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to ask the driver and passenger questions to ascertain the relationship 
between the passenger and driver, the nature of the ride, and the status of the 
passenger. This will indicate whether the ride is commercial (traditional for-
hire ride), private (friendly ride), or quasi-private (modern for-hire ride). The 
classification of the ride will equip the officer to correctly decide whether a 
common enterprise actually exists. Generally, the common enterprise 
assumption is more likely to be reasonable in non-commercial rides—private 
vehicles in which the driver and passengers are friends, family, or the like. 
The assumption is least reasonable in modern for-hire vehicles. In the event 
that the facts and circumstances of the encounter provide an officer with a 
reasonable basis to believe there is a common enterprise, the officer can 
conduct a warrantless search of the passenger. Absent a positive reason to 
believe that a common enterprise exists, a warrantless search of the passenger 
is unreasonable and prohibited. 
a. The Appearance of a Modern For-Hire Vehicle 
Suggests to a Reasonable Officer that a Common 
Enterprise Does Not Exist 
Under the standard approach proposed in the previous section, the 
appearance of modern for-hire vehicles should suggest to officers the absence 
of a common enterprise. While modern for-hire vehicles are privately owned 
vehicles, a reasonable officer using common sense and every day experience 
can easily determine that the occupants of a modern for-hire vehicle are not 
in common enterprise. From the outside looking in, modern for-hire vehicles 
look like normal vehicles. But if an officer takes a closer look, the common 
enterprise assumption is likely to be dispelled. First, Uber and Lyft drivers 
are required to have a trade dress sticker denoting the company’s logo in their 
windshield.200 The logo displayed in the windshield should be sufficient to 
prompt a reasonable officer to inquire further about the nature of the ride. An 
officer upon seeing a vehicle with an Uber or Lyft sign in the windshield, 
with a phone mount holding a smartphone providing GPS services and a 
passenger, should reasonably infer that the driver-passenger relationship is 
one of commercial transportation. If the officer is unsure, he should be 
required to ask if the driver is conducting ridesharing services. As evidenced 
by the facts and circumstances of modern for-hire rides, the common 
enterprise assumption is least reasonable in modern for-hire vehicles. 
 
200 Vehicle Requirements Augusta, supra note 155. 
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D. The Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine Permits Unreasonably 
Intrusive Searches of Modern For-Hire Passengers 
As if the common enterprise assumption was not daunting enough, 
passengers in modern for-hire vehicles will be exposed to highly intrusive 
searches under the search incident to arrest rule. In justification, the Court 
contends that applicability of the first prong of the Gant test is rare because 
“articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely ‘within the area into 
which an arrestee might reach.’”201 But in many events, “the offense of arrest 
will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s 
vehicle and any containers therein.”202 In a situation where the driver is 
arrested for an offense that leads police to reasonably believe that evidence 
of that offense could be found in the vehicle, officers can conduct a full search 
of the passengers and their belongings.203 In effect, the particularized 
suspicion as to the driver is automatically transferred on to the passengers. 
While this search is restricted to uncovering evidence of the crime of arrest, 
if other illegal evidence is found in a police officer’s search, then that other 
evidence may be seized. Obviously, this raises serious privacy concerns in 
modern for-hire vehicles because passengers will be subject to extremely 
intrusive searches based on the conduct of a stranger. 
As the rule stands now, passengers are subject to searches they did 
nothing to provoke. Simply by being in an arrestee’s vehicle at the time of 
arrest, it is assumed that the passenger knows the driver’s history, their habits, 
and whether the driver is law abiding or not. This assumption is only 
reasonable when the passenger has actual familiarity with the driver. By 
choosing to ride in a car with friends and neighbors, passengers may take 
certain risks based on the logical assumptions that can be made. Friends are 
more likely to know enough about the driver, their habits, and their 
background to knowledgeably assess the risks they are subjecting themselves 
to by riding in their vehicle.  
When a passenger has familiarity with the driver, a warrantless search 
under the rule is reasonable because the passenger’s self-diminished privacy 
interests are outweighed by the government’s interest in police safety and 
preserving evidence. For example, consider a situation in which a passenger 
is driven by a friend who is known to smoke marijuana while driving in a 
state where marijuana is illegal. Even if neither marijuana nor drug 
paraphernalia are visible during the time the friend was in the car, the 
 
201 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 
(1981)). 
202 Id. at 344. 
203 Id. at 347. 
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passenger has sufficient knowledge about the driver and the car to know that 
it is likely that there will be marijuana in the car. Therefore, by getting into 
the car despite the passenger’s familiarity with the driver, the passenger 
knowingly subjects himself to police intrusion. By getting into a car with a 
friend, neighbor, or family member, these passengers have enough 
knowledge about the driver and the car to assess the risks they take by 
entering into the driver’s vehicle.  
On the other hand, a search of a passenger in a modern for-hire vehicle, 
incident to arrest of the driver, is highly intrusive and unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. The assumptions that underlie the search incident to 
arrest rule do not exist in modern for-hire vehicles. Modern for-hire 
passengers do not have enough familiarity with their driver or the vehicle to 
make a reasonable risk assessment. While the passenger may know basic 
facts about the driver (such as the driver’s name, rating, and the make of the 
vehicle), this information is not enough for the passenger to assess the type 
of risks he is subjecting himself to by riding in the vehicle. This information 
does not caution the passenger about the driver’s habits or what police 
intrusion might lie ahead. In application, the passenger’s person and personal 
belongings may be subject to a search because the police’s suspicion is 
localized to a driver he met 30 seconds ago, despite the fact that the passenger 
had no idea or information to cause him to believe the driver would be 
engaged in any kind of wrongdoing that would lead to a stop. Given the 
nature of these rides, a search of a modern for-hire passenger under the search 
incident to arrest exception allows officers to intrude the passenger’s privacy 
for being at the wrong place at the wrong time. 
As a result, absent a familiarity between the driver and passenger, such 
an extensive search of a passenger based on the driver’s arrest incorrectly 
“undervalues the privacy interests at stake.”204 The justification for extensive 
searches of passengers under the exception is to uncover evidence regarding 
the offense committed by the driver, but evidence of the driver’s offense will 
not be found on the passenger’s person or belongings. The justifications of 
the rule are not served by searching modern for-hire passengers. The driver 
and passenger are strangers: considering the nature of these rides, there is no 
reasonable basis for believing that evidence of the driver’s offense will be 
uncovered by searching the passenger. Instead, this extensive search of 
passengers will only uncover evidence unrelated to the offense of arrest, 
which will serve to make the rule a pretext for searching passengers in the 
absence of probable cause. This rule is only reasonable if the passenger 
knows enough about the driver and the car to assess the risk the passenger is 
taking by entering into a vehicle which may be subject to police intrusion. 
 
204 Id. at 344–45. 
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Allowing the scope of a search incident to arrest to include searches of 
passengers is unreasonable in modern for-hire vehicles. Modern for-hire 
passengers do not have sufficient knowledge about the driver or the vehicle 
to justify the intrusive search permissible under the search incident to arrest 
rule. 
IV. RESOLUTION 
Future courts are likely to find that passengers in modern for-hire 
vehicles have a legitimate expectation of privacy “by virtue of . . . [their] right 
to exclude.”205 Yet, the protections of the current Fourth Amendment doctrine 
are unreasonable. First, the common enterprise assumption is unreasonable 
in modern for-hire vehicles because of the commercial nature of the driver-
passenger relationship. Additionally, the scope of searches incident to arrest 
are unreasonably broad, because the rule allows modern for-hire passengers 
to be searched despite their lack of familiarity with the driver and the vehicle. 
Although these are two separate doctrines, they are both based on the archaic 
assumption that drivers and passengers typically ride with friends, family, or 
co-conspirators. Considering that the essence of modern transportation is that 
individuals ride in vehicles with strangers, the Court’s archaic assumptions 
are expressly unreasonable. In application, the current doctrine only serves 
to diminish a passenger’s privacy rights based simply on physical proximity 
to someone “independently suspected of criminal activity.”206  
While it may have been optional to use an automobile at one point, today 
most individuals need to use automobiles. It is tremendously unreasonable 
for an individual to be stripped of his Fourth Amendment protections for 
engaging in necessary means of travel. A balancing of interests under 
traditional standards of reasonableness suggests that the privacy interests of 
passengers in modern for-hire vehicles outweigh the need to promote 
legitimate government interests. It is evident that change is needed, but 
because the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine is long-established, it is 
unlikely that the Court will abandon this precedent. Thus, it should be 
updated to accommodate the new realities of modern transportation. 
Because modern for-hire vehicles are a hybrid between commercial and 
private vehicles, it is important for future courts to understand that their 
differences should shape the Fourth Amendment analysis. Using a set of 
cogent factors, future courts should consider the impact of modern 
transportation on passenger’s privacy interests. These factors include: the 
geographical composition of the vehicle, the nature of the ride, an 
 
205 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
206 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). 
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individual’s subjective belief of control over a vehicle, and an individual’s 
actual ability to control the vehicle.  
Next, because the Court has held that “mere propinquity to others”207 is 
not enough to establish probable cause, the common enterprise rule and the 
search incident to arrest rule should be applied as constitutional standards. 
Application of the common enterprise assumption as a standard would 
require officers to consider the facts and circumstances of each case before 
presuming that occupants in a vehicle are engaged in a common enterprise. 
Using common sense and every day experience, officers should be required 
to ask the driver and passenger questions to ascertain the relationship 
between the passenger and driver, the nature of the ride, and the status of the 
passenger. In the event that the facts and circumstances of the encounter 
provide an officer with a reasonable basis to believe that there is a common 
enterprise, the assumption is proper, and a warrantless search of the 
passenger is permissible. Otherwise, absent a positive reason to believe a 
common enterprise exists, a warrantless search of a passenger in a modern 
for-hire vehicle is unreasonable. 
Furthermore, the application of the search incident to arrest doctrine as 
a standard would require officers to consider the totality of the circumstances. 
In the event that the driver of a modern for-hire vehicle is arrested, and the 
offense of arrest provides the officer a reason to believe that evidence of the 
offense could be found in the vehicle, the officer can only search the 
passenger if the facts and circumstances of the encounter reasonably suggest 
that the passenger has sufficient familiarity with the driver. Officers would 
be required to ask the driver and passenger questions to ascertain the 
relationship between the passenger and driver, the nature of the ride, and the 
status of the passenger. Under the search incident to arrest standard, a 
warrantless search of the passenger is only permissible if the totality of the 
circumstances reasonably suggests that the passenger knew the driver, or that 
the passenger had reason to know that there was contraband in the vehicle. If 
a passenger does not have sufficient familiarity with the driver and the 
vehicle, a warrantless search of the passenger would be unreasonable. 
Accordingly, converting the common enterprise assumption and the 
search incident to arrest rule into a standard adequately balances the 
passengers’ privacy interests with the government’s interests. A standard 
driven approach will honor the existing Fourth Amendment precedent but 
will also give weight to the distinguishing aspects of modern for-hire 
vehicles. This approach will assist future courts in understanding how 
 
207 Id. 
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modern advances affect the Katz test and shape “the evolution of societal 
privacy expectations.”208 
 
 
208 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (referencing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 347 (1967)). 
